Features Hub

What Does Digital Sovereignty Mean in Practice for European Organisations?

Wed 21 Oct 2026

Two technology professionals discussing network equipment in a server room, with binary code overlays representing digital infrastructure and connectivity.

Following a cyberattack in September 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) began reassessing its technology infrastructure. The review exposed dependencies with implications for the Court’s operational independence, raising questions about what digital sovereignty means in practice.

Approximately 92% of the Court’s judicial processes depended directly or indirectly on US companies or businesses with significant US exposure, according to the ICC’s Registrar, Osvaldo Zavala Giler.

Speaking at ONE Conference in The Hague, Zavala Giler explained how geopolitical developments had changed the Court’s assessment of its technology suppliers.

The possibility of losing access to critical technology services had raised concerns about the Court’s ability to maintain judicial operations under changing political and legal conditions.

“Efficiency and resilience are not the same thing,” he said.

The ICC’s experience highlighted the operational implications of digital sovereignty for organisations dependent on external technology providers.

Understanding Where Digital Dependencies Exist

Following the cyberattack, the ICC developed a programme to strengthen its security infrastructure, initially selecting established global technology providers that offered proven capabilities.

The introduction of US sanctions targeting ICC officials in February 2025 subsequently prompted the Court to reconsider whether those arrangements provided sufficient operational independence.

The organisation conducted an assessment covering its business processes, applications, suppliers and underlying technological dependencies.

The resulting 92% figure was significant because multiple systems supporting separate judicial functions could ultimately rely on the same technology providers.

The ICC’s experience reflected wider concerns about interconnected digital infrastructure.

The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity’s 2026 Threat Landscape identified dependencies across digital ecosystems as a factor expanding organisations’ exposure to cyber threats.

For enterprises, understanding these relationships requires looking beyond individual supplier contracts to identify which external services support critical operations.

A dependency may be acceptable under normal circumstances but become more consequential when an organisation has limited alternatives.

When Does Concentration Become a Resilience Risk?

The ICC’s assessment exposed a difficult trade-off.

Large technology providers offer sophisticated security capabilities and integrated services that would be expensive for organisations to reproduce independently. Consolidating around those platforms can therefore make operational sense.

However, relying on a small number of suppliers can concentrate the consequences of disruption.

The AWS Bahrain outage illustrated another dimension of infrastructure dependency, after physical damage affecting multiple Availability Zones left some customers unable to access resources hosted exclusively within the affected region.

Zavala Giler explained that the Court had selected established technology providers for legitimate reasons, including their security capabilities. The changing geopolitical environment meant it also needed to consider the possibility that access to those services could be restricted.

The ICC subsequently began reassessing its architecture to reduce the risk that a single external dependency could prevent it from carrying out its judicial functions.

The Court’s experience highlighted the importance of assessing supplier concentration according to its operational consequences, regardless of where the technology provider was based.

The European Commission’s technology sovereignty agenda also addressed Europe’s reliance on external technology providers and the need to strengthen its capacity to make independent technology decisions.

Digital Sovereignty and the Importance of Choice

During the ONE Conference discussion, Zavala Giler distinguished technological independence from self-sufficiency.

“Sovereignty is not self-reliant. Sovereignty is optionality,” said Zavala Giler.

He argued that international organisations could not realistically develop and operate every technology they required. Instead, sovereignty depended on retaining meaningful choice over suppliers and understanding where critical decisions sat outside an organisation’s control.

For the ICC, this had involved examining alternative technologies and developing an environment capable of continuing operations if particular suppliers became unavailable.

Zavala Giler said the Court had moved towards an open-source-based digital workspace in approximately six months, although questions remained around interoperability and long-term support.

His argument also raised questions about how organisations assess the technologies they use.

A European cloud provider may offer greater control over certain aspects of infrastructure, but dependencies on other technologies or services can remain.

Starling Bank’s decision to develop an AI model using UK sovereign cloud infrastructure provides an example of this approach. While the bank is diversifying its cloud suppliers through Civo, its infrastructure continues to rely on NVIDIA technology.

Similarly, organisations using global technology providers may retain operational flexibility where they have workable contingency arrangements and understand the implications of switching suppliers.

The availability and practicality of those alternatives therefore become important considerations when assessing digital sovereignty.

Why Switching Technology Providers Remains Difficult

Creating those alternatives presents a separate challenge.

Maarten Roelfs, founder of European productivity platform Office.eu, described how difficulties finding a suitable European alternative prompted him to develop a service built around open-source technology.

Speaking to journalists at the ONE Conference, Roelfs explained that Office.eu used Nextcloud as part of its foundation, alongside additional functionality intended to provide a more complete productivity environment.

He said the company had approximately 53,000 people from organisations on its waiting list, which Office.eu estimated represented between 1.2 million and 1.4 million potential user seats.

These were company-reported figures rather than independently verified demand or confirmed customers.

At the time of the interview, Office.eu had opened its cloud storage service to consumers, with document editing, spreadsheets and email services scheduled for subsequent release.

Roelfs also confirmed that the company had not yet signed paying business customers.

His experience highlighted the practical difficulties organisations faced when considering alternative technology suppliers.

Roelfs explained that moving an individual user or small business between productivity platforms could be relatively straightforward. Migrating an organisation with 5,000 or 50,000 users, however, required a substantial project.

Established environments can contain years of configuration and interconnected workflows that must be considered before switching.

Roelfs argued that the technology needed to support migration existed, but the complexity of the incumbent environment determined how much work was required.

For larger organisations, changing suppliers therefore involved a significant operational undertaking, with migration requiring planning beyond the selection of a replacement product.

This also raised questions about whether European technology providers could offer sufficiently mature and interoperable alternatives for organisations with complex requirements.

How Can Firms Reduce Dependency on Global Platforms?

The practical implications of digital sovereignty extend beyond selecting suppliers based on their location.

Organisations need to understand which dependencies support their most important functions and assess what would happen if access to those services were interrupted.

That includes examining the feasibility of migration and the resources required to move between providers.

The EU Data Act introduced requirements intended to make switching between cloud and data-processing services easier.

Its provisions included measures supporting portability and interoperability, with switching charges, including data-egress charges, scheduled to be prohibited from 12 January 2027.

These measures were intended to reduce some of the commercial barriers to changing providers, although the technical complexity of migrating established enterprise systems remained an important consideration.

Organisations must also assess where supplier concentration presents an unacceptable risk and where the benefits of existing technology justify continued dependence.

For the ICC, the consequences were particularly significant because access to technology could affect its ability to carry out judicial proceedings.

The Court’s experience demonstrated the importance of understanding digital dependencies before a crisis exposed them. Office.eu’s development highlighted the work involved in creating alternatives that organisations could realistically adopt.

Digital sovereignty ultimately depends on whether organisations retain enough practical choice to continue operating when the external conditions surrounding their technology change.

Join Tech Show Paris

18 - 19 November 2026, Porte de Versailles, Paris

Where France’s technology leaders turn strategy into impact.

Join decision-makers, experts and technology leaders for high-value conferences, real-world use cases, and peer exchange across AI, cloud, cybersecurity, DevOps, data, and data centres.

Tags:

digital infrastructure Digital Sovereignty EU Data Act Technology Sovereignty vendor lock-in
Send us a correction Send us a news tip

Subscribe for News in Your Inbox